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Abstract
Subliminal manipulation is often considered harmless because its effects typically decay within a second. So far, subliminal
long-term effects on behavior were only observed in studies which repeatedly presented highly familiar information such
as single words. These studies suggest that subliminal messages are only slowly stored and might not be stored at all if they
provide novel, unfamiliar information. We speculated that subliminal messages might affect delayed decision-making es-
pecially if messages contain several pieces of novel information that must be relationally bound in long-term memory.
Relational binding engages the hippocampal memory system, which can rapidly encode and durably store novel relations.
Here, we hypothesized that subliminally presented stimulus pairs would be relationally processed influencing the direction
of delayed conscious decisions. In experiment 1, subliminal face–occupation pairs affected conscious decisions about the
income of these individuals almost half an hour later. In experiment 2, subliminal presentation of vocabulary of a foreign
language enabled participants to later decide whether these foreign words are presented with correct or incorrect transla-
tions. Subliminal influence did not significantly decay if probed after 25 versus 15 min. This is unprecedented evidence of
the longevity and impact of subliminal messages on conscious, rational decision-making.
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Introduction
Subliminal messages exert diverse influences on our thoughts
and our behavior (van Gaal et al., 2012; Hassin, 2013). Subliminal
stimuli can facilitate conscious processing of related information
(Van den Bussche et al., 2009), change our current mood (Monahan
et al., 2000), boost our motivation (Aarts et al., 2008), and can even
alter our political attitudes and voting intentions (Hassin et al.,
2007; Weinberger and Westen, 2008). With such a broad impact,
subliminally planted information might have the potential to al-
ter our decisions in everyday situations such as voting.
In order to influence decision-making in real-life situations,
subliminal messages must be stored for long-term after only a
few exposures, e.g. after a single confrontation with a sublimi-
nal TV advert. Furthermore, messages must be stored even if
they contain complex relational information that requires se-
mantic integration, such as “politician X will lower the taxes.”
For subliminal manipulation to be effective, humans thus have
to be able to semantically integrate and rapidly store uncon-
scious pieces of novel information into long-lasting associative
memories that can be retrieved if relevant to the context of a
later decision.
The processes which allow novel information to shape
subsequent decisions are generally thought to depend on con-
sciousness – be it the integration of novel information into ab-
stract mental representations (e.g. Tononi, 2004), rapid
encoding of these representations into long-term memory (e.g.
Shanks, 2010), or the use of these representations to make in-
formed decisions (e.g. Newell and Shanks, 2014). However,
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growing evidence indicates that the human unconscious can
perform various high-level cognitive functions (van Gaal et al.,
2012; Hassin, 2013) that might allow decision processes to bene-
fit from subliminal messages.
Several studies reported that subliminally planted informa-
tion can be semantically integrated outside conscious awareness
(for a detailed review, see Mudrik et al., 2014). Indeed, humans can
detect incompatible object-background configurations in sublimi-
nal scenes (Mudrik and Koch, 2013), solve subliminally presented
arithmetic problems (Garcıa-Orza et al., 2009; Van Opstal et al.,
2011; Sklar et al., 2012; Karpinski et al., 2016), and draw inferences
from subliminal picture sequences and word pairs (Kawakami
and Yoshida, 2015 and Reber and Henke, 2012, respectively).
Subliminal stimulation was further found to nonconsciously
shape decision-making – at least if masked stimuli consisted of
single familiar items that required little integration. For example,
priming studies reported that subliminal primes not only facilitate
correct responses to related targets in a classification task, but
also bias responses in “free choice” tasks in which participants
can freely decide between response alternatives (Schlaghecken
and Eimer, 2004; Klapp and Haas, 2005; Kiesel et al., 2006;
Parkinson and Haggard, 2014; Ocampo, 2015). Similarly, studies on
subliminal persuasion suggested that repeated subliminal expo-
sure to brand names (e.g. “Lipton Ice Tea”) or goal-relevant words
(e.g. “thirst” in thirsty participants) can bias participants’ product
choices (Karremans et al., 2006; Bermeitinger et al., 2009;
Verwijmeren et al., 2011, 2013) or reinforce a certain behavior (e.g.
to drink, see Strahan et al., 2002). Thus, there is ample evidence
that subliminal messages can be integrated unconsciously and
can influence decisions and choices.
Whether subliminally presented information is stored in
long-term memory to guide delayed decisions is vastly unknown.
So far, studies on information integration and decision-making
only assessed immediate influences of subliminal stimulation.
Priming studies which assessed the longevity of subliminal influ-
ences usually reported that behavioral effects of masked primes
decay within 1 s (e.g. Forster et al., 1990; Ferrand, 1996; Greenwald
et al., 1996). This suggests that subliminal information is not
stored and thus cannot affect delayed decisions. Yet, some stud-
ies reported that longer lasting subliminal influences on behavior
are possible under certain conditions. In many of these studies,
the same subliminal messages were presented multiple times
(Lowery et al., 2007; Capa et al., 2011; Levy et al., 2014; Farooqui
and Manly, 2015). Furthermore, participants were often informed
about the presence of subliminal stimuli and were provided con-
scious feedback or rewards after each subliminal message (Aarts
et al., 2008; Capa et al., 2011; Farooqui and Manly, 2015) or were
asked to consciously detect or classify each subliminal event
(Gaillard et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2009; Chong et al., 2014). These
studies thus suggest that subliminal messages are only slowly
stored and are only retained if subjects have the explicit inten-
tion to process the hidden events. Importantly, most studies
used familiar information such as single words as subliminal
stimuli to prime subsequent conscious processing of this infor-
mation (Gaillard et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2009; Chong et al., 2014)
or to prime a specific goal (e.g. to perform well on a test), inten-
tion, or stereotype (Lowery et al., 2007; Capa et al., 2011; Levy
et al., 2014). This suggests that subliminal long-term effects are
achieved only if familiar information is presented but not if novel
relational information has to be learned.
We asked if humans can rapidly integrate and store novel
relational information (e.g. “person X is a manager”, see Fig. 1a)
from subliminal messages for later use in a decision-making
situation (e.g. “guess the income of X”). We speculate that
subliminal messages should be stored especially if they consist
of multiple items that require relational processing. Relational
binding calls upon the hippocampal memory system, which
can rapidly store novel relations for long term (Henke et al.,
1997; Holdstock et al., 2002; Harand et al., 2012). Traditional
views hold that hippocampus is only involved in the encoding
and retrieval of consciously perceived information (Moscovitch,
1995; Squire and Zola, 1996; Tulving, 2002), and that associative
learning outside conscious awareness is unlikely (Shanks,
2010). However, growing evidence suggests that hippocampus
operates independently of consciousness and that noncon-
scious relational learning is humanly feasible (for reviews, see
e.g. Reder et al., 2009; Henke, 2010; Dew and Cabeza, 2011;
Hannula and Greene, 2012; Olsen et al., 2012). Indeed, hippo-
campus was found to mediate implicit learning (Chun and
Phelps, 1999; Greene et al., 2006; Negash et al., 2015) and
retrieval (Greene et al., 2007; Hannula and Ranganath, 2009;
Addante, 2015; Reber et al., 2016) of relational information be-
tween visible stimuli. Most importantly, hippocampus was also
found to be involved in the encoding and retrieval of sublimi-
nally presented stimulus pairs (Henke et al., 2003; Reber et al.,
2012; Duss et al., 2014; Zu¨st et al., 2015).
We ran two experiments to test whether subliminal stimu-
lus pairs would affect delayed decision-making (Figure 1a).
In experiment 1, we tested whether subliminal presentations of
face–occupation pairs would guide later conscious decisions
about the income of the same faces. We assessed the longevity
of subliminal influence by measuring its decay across delays of
15–25 min. In experiment 2, we assessed if new vocabulary of a
foreign language is acquired subliminally affecting later lexical-
semantic decisions on the same foreign words. Both experi-
ments were composed of an encoding phase, an encoding-test
interval that was filled with rest, and a test phase (Fig. 1a). The
decision task given in the test phase constituted an indirect (im-
plicit) memory test. Importantly, participants were kept naı¨ve
regarding subliminal stimulation until the end of the experi-
ment. This allowed us to assess subliminal influences in the ab-
sence of any explicit intention to process the hidden messages.
Method
General procedure
Unless indicated otherwise, experimental procedures were
identical for both experiments. We used a well-established par-
adigm to render stimuli invisible (Duss et al., 2011). Each stimu-
lus was presented 12 times for 17 ms during one unconscious
encoding episode of 6 s duration (see Supplementary Fig. 1).
Stimuli were preceded and followed by visual noise masks
(sandwich masking). In experiment 1, 40 face–word pairs were
encoded in 40 unconscious encoding episodes. In experiment 2,
each unconscious encoding episode contained a pseudoword–
word pair that was presented twice in nonadjacent repetitions,
yielding a total of 48 encoding episodes for 24 pseudoword–
word pairs. Stimuli and masks were embedded in an attention
task which allowed us to direct participants’ focal attention to
the screen without disclosing the presence of subliminal
messages (see Supplementary Fig. 1). The task required partici-
pants to respond to target screens that appeared at random
times once in every encoding episode (see Supplementary Fig.
1). Mean hit rate to targets was>85% in both experiments.
Following the attention task, participants rested for 15, 20, or
25 min (depending on experiment and condition) before per-
forming the decision tasks. The attention task and the decision
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task were briefly practiced at the beginning of the experiment
using a few stimuli that were not used later on.
Following the main experiments, a structured interview was
performed to assess subjective awareness for subliminal infor-
mation. Using funneled questions, we first asked participants
whether they had seen any unexpected stimuli during the at-
tention task or had suspected the presence of any hidden infor-
mation, and then asked more specifically whether they had
seen hidden faces or words. We then informed participants of
the subliminal stimulation and administered forced-choice
tests to assess awareness of subliminal stimuli objectively.
Masking paradigm and attention task in these awareness tests
were the same as in the main experiments. However, aware-
ness was tested trial-by-trial: following each encoding episode
of a new stimulus pair, the attention task was interrupted and
participants were asked to provide information about the sub-
liminal stimuli. We expected participants to perform at chance
level in these tests if masking rendered stimuli truly subliminal.
Experiments were approved by the local ethics committee.
Written semi-informed consent was obtained from all partici-
pants before experimentation. The information about sublimi-
nal stimulation was provided following the experiment.
Participants
We recruited participants with normal or corrected-to-normal
visual acuity. In experiment 1, two participants were excluded
post hoc due to errors in data logging. Of the remaining 46 partici-
pants (19 men and 27 women, mean age¼ 36.0), 23 were tested
with a 15 min delay between subliminal encoding and decision-
making, and 23 with a 25 min delay. In experiment 2, two partici-
pants were excluded post hoc because they had failed to report
their decisions within the response time window. The remaining
sample consisted of 23 women and 11 men (mean age¼ 22.8).
Experiment 1
During the encoding phase, we presented 10 faces combined
with written high-wage occupations and 10 faces with low-
wage occupations (Fig. 1a). Twenty additional faces were paired
with consonant strings and presented subliminally in a control
condition (not reported). Each stimulus pair was presented in
just one subliminal encoding episode, which comprised 12 stim-
ulus repetitions within 6 s. The encoding-test interval spanned
15 or 25 min. In the test phase, the former subliminal faces were
re-presented for 5 s for conscious inspection with the instruc-
tion to decide whether an individual would earn a high or low
income.
Objective awareness tests
We administered two forced-choice tests to assess awareness
of subliminal faces and occupations objectively. In each test, we
presented 40 novel face–occupation pairs subliminally using the
same attention task as in the main experiment. Immediately
following the encoding of a novel pair in a subliminal encoding
episode, the attention task was interrupted and participants
were interrogated regarding the just presented face or occupa-
tion. In the face-awareness test, the just subliminally presented
face and a novel face were presented side by side for conscious
inspection. Participants were asked to select the face that they
thought was just flashed subliminally. In the occupation-
awareness test, the text “Income?” was presented which signa-
led participants to name the income (“high” vs. “low”) that they
thought would the just subliminally flashed occupation yield.
After giving their response, the attention task was continued
and a new face–occupation pair was presented subliminally.
Participants took either 40 face-awareness trials followed by 40
occupation awareness trials or vice versa.
Material
We used 160 grayscale images of male faces that were given av-
erage income ratings in a pilot study. Images were equalized re-
garding luminance and contrast and were assigned to 16 lists of
10 faces each. Lists were comparable with respect to income,
age, facial hair, and emotional facial expression. Lists were
counterbalanced over experimental conditions such that each
face was presented an equal number of times with a high- and
a low-wage occupation and with a consonant string. All faces
were also rotated into the two awareness tests. Stimuli were
presented an equal number of times in the main experiment,
and the awareness tests of faces and occupations. Hence, re-
sults in the experiment and the awareness test derived from
the same stimulus material (presented to different
participants).
We used 10 typical high- and 10 low-wage occupation words
that were similar regarding mean logarithmic word frequency
(a) (b)
Figure 1. (a) Design of experiments 1 and 2. Subliminal presentation of face–occupation pairs (Experiment 1) or pairs consisting of pseudowords
and their translations (Experiment 2) altered participants’ decisions when later asked to rate the income of faces or to identify correct (match-
ing) translations of pseudowords. (b) Results. Two-tailed t-tests indicated that decision accuracy was significantly above the 50% chance level
(mean accuracy with 95% confidence interval). *P < 0.05, **P < 0.01.
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(Leipzig Corpora Collection, http://corpora.uni-leipzig.de/) and
character count.
Faces were displayed at the center of the screen in front of a
dark gray background. Words were presented below the faces in
light gray in a sans-serif font. Stimuli were delivered at a visual
angle of 15 using a Digital Light Processing (DLP) projector with
a 60 Hz refresh rate.
Experiment 2
Participants encoded 24 combinations of written pseudowords
(fictitious foreign language) and German words (fictitious trans-
lations). We presented these pseudoword–word combinations
subliminally for unconscious semantic relational encoding us-
ing the same paradigm as in experiment 1. There were two
nonadjacent subliminal encoding episodes (each comprising 12
stimulus repetitions within 6 s) per word pair within a random-
ized sequence of subliminal encoding episodes. The encoding-
test interval spanned 20 min. At test, we re-presented the same
foreign words for 5 s for conscious inspection. Each foreign
word was shown besides a German word that was a synonym
to the subliminal German translation of either this or another
foreign word. Synonyms were used to test for semantic rather
than perceptual relational retrieval. Half of foreign words pre-
sented at test were recombined to break the encoded semantic
relation (incorrect translations) and half were combined to keep
the semantic relation from encoding to test (correct translation).
Participants were instructed to decide whether or not a pre-
sented foreign word and the German translation word fit
together (match/mismatch decision).
Objective awareness test
We administered one forced-choice test to assess awareness
of subliminal words objectively. Participants encoded 24 (novel)
pseudoword–German word pairs. Following each subliminal
encoding episode, a probe word was displayed for conscious in-
spection for participants to decide whether or not the probe was
a synonym to the just presented subliminal German word. In
half the trials, the probe was a valid synonym to the sublimi-
nally presented German word, in the other half the probe was
an unrelated foil. Hence, we assessed the semantic processing
of subliminal words, as in the main experiment.
Material
We created 48 word triplets consisting of a pseudoword, its
German translation used for subliminal encoding, and a syno-
nym to the German translation used for the decision task
(see Fig. 1). German synonym pairs were gathered from Open
Thesaurus (http://www.openthesaurus.de/). Two-syllabic pro-
nounceable pseudowords were created using German and Dutch
syllables provided by the Celex database (http://celex.mpi.nl/).
The 48 encoding stimuli were assigned to four lists of 12 items
each with equal distributions of word lengths, pronounceabil-
ity, concreteness, animatedness, and logarithmic frequency of
appearance (drawn from Leipzig Corpora Collection, http://cor
pora.uni-leipzig.de/). Assignment of German translations to
pseudowords was randomized anew for each list and each par-
ticipant to reduce potential bias resulting from particular combi-
nations. Two lists were used for the main experiment and the
other two lists for the awareness test; this assignment was coun-
terbalanced over participants. Twelve further German words
were used as foils in the awareness test. Pseudowords were dis-
played in the left and German words in the right visual field
of participants. Words were presented for subliminal encoding
using the same masking paradigm and psychophysical condi-
tions as applied in experiment 1.
Results
Experiment 1
In experiment 1, we tested whether subliminal presentations of
face–occupation pairs would influence later classification of the
same faces. We hypothesized that participants would rate indi-
viduals who had earlier been flashed with a high-wage or
low-wage occupation as high-income or low-income earners,
respectively. A two-tailed t-test on the mean decision accuracy
confirmed this hypothesis. Mean decision accuracy was 53.97%
(95% CI [51.25, 56.96]), which exceeded the chance level of 50%
(t(45)¼ 2.94, P¼ 0.005; r¼ 0.40) (Fig. 1b). Mean decision accuracy
was not significantly smaller after 25 compared to 15 min
(53.04% vs. 54.90%; two-tailed t(44)¼ 0.68, P¼ 0.50; r¼ 0.10),
which indicates that the effect of subliminal encoding persisted
through both retention intervals at equal strength. Hence, new
semantic associations were stored for long term affecting the
direction of decision-making almost half an hour later.
An interview that was administered after the main experi-
ment to assess subjective awareness of the masked stimuli sug-
gested that none of the participants had seen the subliminal
faces or words during encoding. Two objective awareness tests
further indicated that masked stimuli could not be consciously
perceived. Participants performed at chance level of 50% if
asked which one of two faces had just been presented sublimi-
nally (mean recognition accuracy¼ 48.81%, 95% CI [46.36, 51.27],
missing data of one participant due to data loss) or if a high-or
low-wage occupation had been presented (mean recognition
accuracy¼ 49.06%, 95% CI [46.90, 51.23]). The t-tests against
chance level were not significant (awareness for faces:
t(43)¼0.98, P¼ 0.34, r¼ 0.15; awareness for occupations:
t(44)¼0.90, P¼ 0.37, r¼ 0.13), suggesting that participants were
consciously unaware of the subliminal stimuli. However, the
nonsignificant tests do not reveal whether participants were
truly unaware (i.e. whether H0 can be accepted), or whether our
tests were not sensitive enough to detect awareness. We, there-
fore, calculated Bayes factors for the two t-tests following the
recommendations provided in Dienes (2008, 2014). Bayes factors
(BF) indicate the relative strength of two hypotheses H1 and H0
with a BF(H1/H0)¼ 1 suggesting that the data are inconclusive
and favor neither hypothesis, and BFs> 3 or< 1/3 suggesting
substantial evidence for H1 or H0, respectively. Assuming that
awareness of subliminal stimuli should yield recognition accu-
racy that is comparable to performance in the decision task
(3.97% above chance level), we chose a half-normal prior distri-
bution with a mode of 0 and a standard deviation of 3.97% to
calculate BF (Dienes, 2014). The resulting BF for the face-aware-
ness test (mean accuracy¼ 1.19% below chance level,
SE¼ 1.21%) and the occupation-awareness test (mean accu-
racy¼ 0.94% below chance, SE¼ 1.04%) were 0.16 and 0.14, re-
spectively. Both factors were below 1/3, indicating substantial
evidence for the null hypothesis, i.e. that participants were not
aware of the masked stimuli. We further performed a multiple
regression analysis to assess whether potential awareness of
faces or occupations predicted decision accuracy in the main
experiment, and to estimate whether accuracy remained above
chance level if the theoretical awareness in both tests is 0 (i.e.,
whether the intercept is significant). This method was brought
forward by Greenwald et al. (1995). Although subject to criticism
(e.g. Miller, 2000), this method is used widely to assess whether
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subliminal influences on behavior are independent of stimulus
awareness. Neither potential awareness of faces (b¼ 0.16,
t(41)¼ 0.88, P¼ 0.383) nor potential awareness of occupations
(b¼ 0.24, t(41)¼ 1.2, P¼ 0.23) predicted decision accuracy in
the main experiment. Decision accuracy in the main experi-
ment remained above chance level when we controlled for se-
lection accuracy in the two awareness tests (intercept of the
regression with two predictors; t(41)¼ 2.93, P< 0.01, r¼ 0.42). In a
final step, we excluded those participants from the analysis of
the data from the main experiment, who tended to perform
above or below chance level in either of the two awareness tests
(12 participants exhibited an awareness score with a binomial
probability of P< 20%). Classification accuracy in the main ex-
periment remained above chance level (54.12%, 95% CI [50.72,
57.51], t(33)¼ 2.468, P¼ 0.019, r¼ 0.39) with these 12 participants
removed. We, therefore, conclude that there was no awareness
of encoding stimuli in the main experiment and that long-term
effects derived from unconscious processing alone.
Experiment 2
In experiment 2, we tested for long-term effects using a sublimi-
nal vocabulary acquisition task. We hypothesized that new vo-
cabulary would be encoded subliminally influencing delayed
lexical–semantic decisions on the same foreign words when
they were presented visibly. At test, participants were in-
structed to decide whether or not a given foreign word and a
German translation word fit together (match/mismatch deci-
sion). On average, 52.7% (95% CI [50.1, 55.2]) (Fig. 1b) of syno-
nyms were classified accurately, which exceeded chance level
(two-tailed t-test: t(33)¼ 2.128; P¼ 0.041; r¼ 0.35). Hence, the
meaning of subliminal German words was decoded, linked to
foreign words, and stored to influence lexical–semantic deci-
sions 20 min following subliminal encoding.
An interview administered following the main experiment
assessed the subjective awareness of the masked stimuli.
Participants’ responses indicated that none had consciously
perceived subliminal words or letters. An objective awareness
was used to corroborate the subjective reports. When asked
whether a consciously displayed German word represents a
synonym to a just subliminally flashed German word, partici-
pants decided correctly in 51.3% of cases (95% CI [48.9, 53.8]).
This performance did not significantly exceed chance level of
50% (t(33)¼ 1.121, two-tailed P¼ 0.27; r¼ 0.19). To validate
whether performance was truly at chance level, we again calcu-
lated the Bayes factor for the t-test as suggested by Dienes
(2008, 2014). Assuming that awareness for subliminal words
should yield a recognition accuracy comparable to performance
in the decision task (2.7% above chance level), we chose a
half-normal prior distribution with a mode of 0 and a standard
deviation of 2.7% to estimate the BF (Dienes, 2014). The resulting
factor for the awareness test (mean accuracy¼ 1.3% above
chance level, SE¼ 1.16%) was 1.14, which suggests that the test
was not sensitive enough to reject stimulus awareness.
Whether participants were truly unaware of the subliminal
words thus remains elusive. However, further analyses sug-
gested that subliminal long-term influences on decision-mak-
ing did not benefit from stimulus awareness. First of all, a
regression analysis (Greenwald et al., 1995) indicated that accu-
racy in the awareness test did not predict decision accuracy in
the main experiment (b¼ 0.038, t(32)¼ 0.216, P¼ 0.83), which
was above chance level when selection accuracy on the aware-
ness test was 0 (intercept of regression; t(31)¼ 2.052, P¼ 0.045,
r¼ 0.34). Furthermore, even if those two participants, who
tended to perform above or below chance level in the awareness
test (binomial probability of P< 20%), were excluded from the
analysis of the data from the main experiment, classification
accuracy remained above chance level (52.6%, 95% CI [50.1,
55.1], t(31)¼ 2.142, P¼ 0.040, r¼ 0.36). Although the Bayes analy-
sis yielded an inconclusive result regarding stimulus awareness
in the awareness test, the regression analysis suggests that
long-term effects on decision-making derived from unconscious
processes.
Discussion
To summarize, subliminal verbal and nonverbal item pairs
influenced participants’ conscious, deliberate decisions almost
half an hour following subliminal stimulation. In experiment 1,
subliminal face–occupation pairs influenced conscious deci-
sions on the income of the same individuals after delays of 15
and 25 min. In experiment 2, subliminal presentation of for-
eign language vocabulary influenced participants’ decisions on
correct/incorrect word translations after a delay of 20 min.
These findings provide unprecedented evidence of a consider-
able longevity of subliminal effects on intentional behavior
such as decision-making.
So far, most investigators who addressed the longevity of
subliminal priming reported that subliminal effects on behavior
would fade within 1 s (e.g. Greenwald et al., 1996), which sug-
gests that subliminal messages leave no long-term memory
traces and therefore cannot influence delayed decisions. The
few studies which reported longer lasting effects used familiar
stimuli that were repeatedly presented to participants who
were informed about the presence or purpose of subliminal
events (e.g. Chong et al., 2014; Levy et al., 2014). These studies
suggest that subliminal information may be stored for long term
if it is familiar, if many subliminal exposures are provided for a
slow, incremental encoding process, and if subjects explicitly
intent to process the subliminal information. Whether novel
subliminal information can be integrated and stored following a
single exposure to naı¨ve subjects remains unclear. Even less
clear is whether a subliminal one-time processing has sufficient
strength to influence delayed decision-making. We found that
participants, who were unaware of the presence and purpose of
subliminal information, successfully processed subliminal face–
word and nonword–word pairs and formed lasting unconscious
semantic relational memories based on only one or two sublim-
inal encoding episodes (each comprising 12 adjacent subliminal
stimulus repetitions).
We speculate that the reported rapid encoding and long-
term retention of subliminal information owes to the type of
stimuli and the memory system these stimuli called upon. As
mentioned above, conclusions regarding the longevity of sub-
liminal priming rested on the use of familiar single-item stimuli
such as words (e.g. Forster et al., 1990; Ferrand, 1996; Greenwald
et al., 1996). It is known that the processing of single items en-
gages neocortex (Henke et al., 1997; Duss et al., 2014), which
forms long-term memory traces rather slowly over many learn-
ing trials (McClelland et al., 1995). This might explain why sub-
liminal influences were found to be short-lived or to build up
slowly. Here, we used multi-item displays that contained both
novel (unfamiliar faces or foreign words) and familiar (occupa-
tion words or German translation words) pieces of information.
Relational encoding of multiple stimuli engages hippocampus
(Henke et al., 1997; Duss et al., 2014), which learns rapidly and
stores relations for long term due to its exceptional plasticity
(McClelland et al., 1995). Subliminal relational encoding and
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retrieval have been associated reliably with hippocampal activ-
ity changes (Henke et al., 2003; Reber et al., 2012; Zu¨st et al., 2015).
Importantly, hippocampal damage abolished both supraliminal
(conscious) and subliminal (unconscious) relational binding but
left subliminal single-item priming intact (Duss et al., 2014). As
encoding-test intervals spanned a few minutes or less in these
previous neuroimaging experiments, they were uninformative
regarding longer term effects of subliminal stimuli on behavior.
Using similar stimuli and the same masking technique, we now
demonstrate subliminal effects on decisions delayed by
15–25 min. Because subliminal influences did not noticeably de-
cay from the delay of 15–25 min in experiment 1, we speculate
that subliminally planted information might affect decision-
making even at longer intervals.
The long-lasting influence of subliminal stimulus pairs evin-
ces nonconscious relational learning, but the experimental par-
adigms employed in this study do not pin down the exact
nature of the unconsciously formed memories. Although we as-
sume that subliminal stimulus pairs yield semantically precise
unconscious relational memories (“person X is a manager”,
“gumpel means dog”) that are later reactivated to support deci-
sion-making, our experimental setup cannot rule out the possi-
bility that participants had formed associations between faces/
foreign words and broad semantic or affective categories (e.g.
“person X as a manager must be wealthy”, “I despise gumpel be-
cause I fear dogs”). Such fuzzy semantic/affective associations
could suffice to guide subsequent decisions (“X has a high in-
come because he is wealthy”, “hound is a valid translation of
gumpel because I despise both”). But we would like to point out
that the results of earlier investigations on subliminal encoding
and long-term memory formation demonstrated unequivocally
that subliminal words are understood with high semantic
precision. In Duss et al. (2011), subliminal presentations of
face–occupation pairs influenced participants’ subsequent con-
scious classifications of the same faces when various semantic
dimensions were offered, namely regularity of income, length
of education, and creativity of work. Faces encoded with an ar-
tistic instead of an academic occupation (e.g. “actor” vs.
“lawyer”) were later classified as generating an irregular in-
come, coming from a shorter school education, and performing
creative work. These distinct influences of subliminal informa-
tion on diverse semantic classifications suggest a precise rather
than diffuse lexical–semantic word analysis. Further evidence
for precise subliminal encoding is provided by our studies on
unconscious relational inference (Reber and Henke, 2012; Reber
et al., 2012; Henke et al., 2013). In these studies, overlapping
subliminal word pairs such as “winter-red” and “red-computer”
(A–B, B–C) were presented apart in time and were nevertheless
integrated semantically to influence delayed judgments
regarding the semantic relatedness of A and C, like “winter-
computer”. The successful relational integration in this
subliminal paradigm cannot be explained by affective or fuzzy
semantic word priming.
Doubts have been raised recently as to whether experi-
menters had adequately assessed stimulus awareness and cor-
rectly estimated influences of subliminal stimuli on behavior
(Newell and Shanks, 2014; Hesselmann and Moors, 2015).
To avert such suspicion, we assessed stimulus awareness fol-
lowing the main experiments using objective awareness tests
that had the same statistical power as our decision tasks. The
objective awareness tests confirmed that the subliminal stimu-
lation paradigm rendered stimuli largely (experiment 2) or com-
pletely (experiment 1) imperceptible to the conscious mind, and
that the observed long-term effects of subliminal stimulation
were independent of stimulus awareness. Because we did not
assess awareness of each subliminal stimulus immediately fol-
lowing the respective encoding episode in the main experi-
ments, we cannot rule out the possibility that participants were
briefly aware of some of the subliminal images. However, none
of the participants reported to have noticed the presence of hid-
den or masked information during the main experiments or
during the objective awareness tests. Hence, all available data
suggest that the reported long-term influences of subliminal
stimuli were independent of consciousness.
The finding that subliminally processed information is rap-
idly integrated and stored to guide delayed decisions challenges
prevailing views of the cognitive function of consciousness.
Consciousness is usually considered a precondition for success-
ful information integration (Tononi, 2004; Mudrik et al., 2014),
relational learning (Shanks, 2010), and decision-making
(Bettman et al., 1998; Simonson, 2005; Newell and Shanks, 2014).
However, evidence is accumulating that these notions of con-
sciousness need revision (Dijksterhuis and Nordgren, 2006;
Nordgren, 2006; Reder et al., 2009; Henke, 2010; Dew and Cabeza,
2011; Olsen et al., 2012; Hannula and Greene, 2012; van Gaal
et al., 2012; Hassin, 2013). Indeed, unconscious integration of dif-
ferent semantic concepts and of temporally or spatially distrib-
uted percepts was reported not only for stimuli that were
rendered subliminal using visual masking but also for stimuli
made invisible using continuous flash suppression (Mudrik
et al., 2011; Sklar et al., 2012; Vlassova et al., 2014; Bergstro¨m and
Eriksson, 2015; Karpinski et al., 2016) or visual crowding (Atas
et al., 2013). Even during the unconsciousness of deep sleep,
words, sounds, and odors were found to be integrated (Ruby
et al., 2008; Daltrozzo, et al., 2012) and stored in long-term mem-
ory (Arzi et al., 2012, 2014; Ruch et al., 2014) to modulate behavior
following waking. More evidence for the feasibility of uncon-
scious relational integration is provided by social psychology:
decisions, which require the consideration, weighing and inte-
gration of large amounts of (supraliminally provided) informa-
tion, were better following unconscious deliberation than
conscious reasoning (e.g. Dijksterhuis et al., 2006; Mealor and
Dienes, 2012; Abadie et al., 2013). This ‘deliberation without at-
tention’ effect suggests that our conscious decisions are vitally
influenced by nonconscious processes (but see e.g. Newell and
Shanks, 2014; Nieuwenstein et al., 2015; and Vadillo et al., 2015
for critical reviews).
In sum, our findings add to a growing body of evidence sug-
gesting that subliminal messages can be used to change our
thoughts, attitudes, emotions, and actions (van Gaal et al., 2012;
Hassin, 2013). Subliminal stimulation was shown to influence
current moods (Monahan et al., 2000), political attitudes (Hassin
et al., 2007; Weinberger and Westen, 2008), intentions (Hassin
et al., 2007), choices and decisions (Bermeitinger et al., 2009), and
cognitive strategies (Lau and Passingham, 2007; Reuss et al.,
2011). However, little is known about the longevity of these sub-
liminal influences because these studies were focused mainly
on immediate effects of subliminal stimulation. Here, we dem-
onstrate that a few exposures to novel subliminal information
is sufficient to influence delayed decision-making. The surpris-
ing impact of subliminal messages on rational, intentional, con-
scious behavior lends subliminal protocols to practical
applications, of which advertising is just one example.
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Supplementary data is available at Neuroscience of
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